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Abstract: We address the question of whether and to what extent explanatory and 
modelling strategies in systems biology are mechanistic. After showing how dynamic 
mathematical models are actually required for mechanistic explanations of complex 
systems, we caution readers against expecting all systems biology to be about 
mechanistic explanations. Instead, the aim may be to generate topological explanations 
that are not standardly mechanistic, or to arrive at design principles that explain system 
organization and behaviour in general, but not specific mechanisms. These abstraction 
strategies serve various aims, including prediction and control, that are central to 
understanding the epistemic diversity of systems biology. 
Systems biology is a new and highly interdisciplinary field that combines elements from 
molecular biology and physiology with quantitative modelling approaches from disciplines such 
as engineering, physics, computer science, and mathematics. The term ‘systems biology’ was 
used originally in 1968 by Mesarović to urge the use of systems theory to understand biological 
systems (Mesarović 1968); some commentators would trace the historical roots even further back 
(Green and Wolkenhauer 2013). But when the term is used in the context of contemporary 
bioscience it typically refers to a much more recent approach, initiated in the late 1990s as a 
response to the new experimental techniques and fast computers that allowed the rapid 
sequencing of DNA and automated measurements of molecular interactions (Ideker et al. 2001; 
Kitano 2001). These innovations afforded major new initiatives in the life sciences but also 
produced unforeseen challenges. Systems biology addresses one of these, namely the 
interpretation of extensive quantitative data via mathematical and computational modelling 
(Alberghina and Westerhoff 2005; Boogerd et al. 2007). 
Research in systems biology is driven by complex problems that require multidisciplinary 
integration (Carusi 2014; MacLeod and Nersessian 2014; O’Malley and Soyer 2012). 
Consequently, it is a diverse field. Some proponents pursue strategies that extend molecular 
biology with sequence-based tools (see Chapter 24), while others explore the relevance of 
abstract mathematical systems theory to molecular interactions (O’Malley and Dupré 2005). 
Common to all branches of systems biology is the willingness to borrow reasoning and 
representation tools from engineering and the physical sciences, including network diagrams and 
graph-theory, other types of mathematical modelling (primarily ordinary differential equations) 
and computational simulations. We focus on just one of the many possible questions about 
systems biology: To what extent can the modelling strategies and explanations in systems 
biology be characterized as mechanistic? 
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1. Dynamic Mechanistic Explanation and Other Modelling Aims 
A hallmark of mechanistic research is to understand a complex whole by decomposing it into 
component parts, and by localizing phenomena of interest to certain parts of the system (Bechtel 
and Richardson 1993; Craver 2007; see Chapters 9 and 19). Models in systems biology are 
similarly based on empirically measured molecular entities and interactions. Given the 
abundance of different molecules and pathways in every cell, modelling involves the selection of 
components relevant to the system being investigated (Donaghy 2014). But the role of 
mathematical models and computational tools—as distinctive aspects of systems biology—was 
not addressed in original philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanations (see Chapter 16), 
primarily because molecular systems biology is so new. Lately, the relationship between models 
in systems biology and mechanistic accounts has become an important philosophical topic of 
debate, with some commentators arguing that a traditional mechanistic account is sufficient to 
describe research in systems biology (e.g., Richardson and Stephan 2007), and others instead 
stressing the need for a more pluralistic perspective of explanatory integration (e.g., Braillard 
2010; Fagan 2016; Mekios 2015). 
Although it is possible to focus on differences between dynamic models in systems biology 
and mechanistic explanations in general (Issad and Malaterre 2015; Théry 2015), Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen (2010) instead highlight the continuity between the two by introducing the notion of 
‘dynamic mechanistic explanation.’ Dynamic mechanistic explanations are also based on 
concrete entities and interactions, but they extend mechanistic explanation by mathematically or 
computationally capturing the dynamical operation of the system and its parts across time. In 
fact, in the case of complex systems, mathematical models are required for the purpose of 
mechanistic explanation (Baetu 2015; Bechtel 2012; Brigandt 2013; see Chapter 20). How is this 
the case? 
In addition to decomposition and localization as strategies for discovering mechanism 
components, mechanistic explanations must reassemble those components and specify 
epistemically how their organization and operation result in the overall features of the 
mechanism to be explained (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). Bechtel illustrates the importance 
of mathematical models with circadian rhythms, which are endogenous oscillations of about 24 
hours present in most organisms. A mechanism diagram can depict various components of the 
underlying mechanism, including specific genes and proteins, some of which have oscillating 
expression levels. The diagram can also represent the activation or inhibition of interactions 
among proteins and other entities, thereby depicting positive as well as negative feedback loops 
(see Chapter 18). For some simple mechanisms, mental simulation (using a mechanism diagram) 
suffices to show how the phenomenon to be explained is generated (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
2005). However, in the case of circadian rhythms, only mathematical models are able to reveal 
that over time the component interactions—which involve changing protein concentrations, 
several feedback loops and time-delaying gene expression pathways—actually produce sustained 
periodic oscillations (see also Brigandt 2015). 
Computational modelling strategies in systems biology can thus extend mechanistic 
accounts in various ways. By providing mathematical tools for modelling the dynamics of large 
systems of nonlinear organization, computational models can help researchers recompose 
knowledge about subsystems that have been taken apart for functional analysis. It is well-known 
that there is cross-talk between different mechanisms, and computational tools can afford a better 
understanding of how mechanisms relate to one another dynamically (Bechtel 2015b; Fagan 
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2012). Among the many examples are computer simulations of whole cells (and even organs) 
that explore dynamic interactions between different functional subsystems (Bassingthwaighte et 
al. 2009; Karr et al. 2012). If a mechanistic explanation is characterized as accounting for how a 
system behaviour is causally generated by the organized interaction of its particular parts, 
computational models of circadian rhythms or large-scale simulations can indeed be interpreted 
as vehicles for mechanistic explanations. 
However, we should be careful about assuming that modelling in systems biology is always 
geared towards mechanistic explanations. First, ethnographic studies of research practices in 
systems biology show that scientists may not even frame their modelling aims in terms of 
explanation, but instead, in terms of control or prediction (MacLeod and Nersessian 2015). 
Practical concerns (application) and pragmatic constraints (not all parameters can be measured 
and modelled mathematically) direct particular modelling aims. MacLeod and Nersessian make 
this point with the example of how reducing the amount of cell-wall hardening lignin in plants is 
highly desirable for biofuel production. But because the relevant model of the lignin synthesis 
pathway depends on estimated parameters, it indicates primarily a robust relation between 
particular system components and the lignin output. The model’s main achievement, therefore, is 
to reveal an angle of technological control. Although it does give partial insight into how the 
system works, this model might not yield a mechanistic explanation in the sense of accounting 
for the behaviour of the whole in terms of its parts and their properties (MacLeod and Nersessian 
2015). Second, even when systems biologists have explanation as an explicit target, they may not 
be offering causal explanations of specific systems. Instead, they may intend to provide more 
abstract functional classifications of all the variants of system organization that could possibly 
realize a particular function (see Section 3). 
The lesson we draw from these observations is that while systems biology can fruitfully 
extend philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation to include dynamical and quantitative 
aspects by means of mathematical models and simulations, philosophers investigating systems 
biology also need to pay attention to the diverse practices across this field, and to the actual, 
context-dependent aims of the modellers and experimental researchers. We will take this finding 
into account as we explore mechanisms in systems biology further via the use of network 
analysis. 
2. Network Models: From Motifs to Global Topologies 
Because cellular systems are highly complex webs of molecular interactions, one approach in 
systems biology involves the investigation of networks. A network can be represented and 
studied computationally as a graph, in which the nodes correspond to molecular entities, while an 
edge between two nodes represents an interaction between them. A graph can be undirected, 
such as a protein interaction network that depicts all the interactions in which the protein types 
inside a cell engage, or it can be directed. The latter category includes metabolic reaction 
networks, signal transduction networks, and gene regulatory networks that depict genes 
activating other genes. 
While decomposition and localization have proven to be useful strategies of mechanistic 
research, additional methods (e.g., graph-theoretic and computational) are needed in systems 
biology to process large data sets and analyse highly integrated systems. One particular approach 
is to screen larger networks for the repeated occurrence of the same type of small connectivity 
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patterns called network motifs (Figure 1; Alon 2007). The functionality of any network motif can 
then be investigated computationally. Consider for example a feedforward loop, in which X has a 
direct as well as a mediated input on Z (Figure 1A). Using engineering language, systems 
biologists might say that Z processes its two potential inputs as an AND-gate, which is when 
both inputs are needed for activation. In this case, the motif will function as a persistence 
detector. In other words, output Z will be activated only upon sustained activation of X, which 
can be turned on by some external signal. The reason is that when receiving an input by means of 
the time-delayed pathway via Y (involving two activation steps), Z would not receive a second 
input (directly from X) unless X has already been active for some time. Such a persistence-
detector design makes biological sense when it is energetically costly for an organism to 
synthesize an enzyme that processes a particular substrate. In that case, synthesis is best initiated 
only if the substrate is reliably present. Particular design motifs are expected to function in the 
same general way, whatever the particular biological and environmental contexts of their 
implementation (but see Section 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of network motifs. A: Feedforward loop; B: Single-input motif; C: Dense 
overlapping regulons. Adapted with permission from Alon (2007), copyright Taylor and Francis 
Group LLC Books. 
Network motifs abstract away from a good deal of molecular detail. They neither specify 
what kinds of entities the nodes are, nor do they indicate the actual means by which one entity 
would activate another (e.g., that a eukaryotic gene is transcribed to RNA, which when 
transported outside the nucleus is translated to a protein, which later binds to a different gene so 
as to activate it). Despite this loss of mechanistic detail, Levy and Bechtel (2013) argue that the 
analysis of a network motif is still a dynamic mechanistic explanation. This is because once 
abstracted, the network account points directly to the organization of the mechanism that is 
responsible for the phenomenon to be explained. Generally, this sort of abstraction occurs widely 
in systems biological modelling, including the examples already mentioned in Section 1 (see 
Chapters 17 and 35). 
Even though the analysis of an individual network motif’s functionality might be largely 
mechanistic, what makes research on network motifs distinctively systems-biological stems from 
the fact that large networks are screened to determine the frequency with which motifs occur 
(e.g., the feedforward loop is known to be highly abundant). Doing so reveals both common and 
uncommon elements of biological design, and draws attention to the former, which are likely to 
be more biologically important. Moreover, different kinds of large networks, from gene 
regulatory to neural networks, can be screened for the same design element. This generalizability 
also applies to networks from different taxa, whether prokaryotes or eukaryotes. These strategies 
indicate that abstract organizational schemes, which systems biologists call design principles, 
transcend the organization of a single mechanism, and even a single species (Green 2015b). We 
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will elaborate on design principles in Section 3. 
While the scrutiny of an individual motif pertains to a very small network, research at the 
other end of the spectrum investigates large networks for their global properties, also via graph-
theoretical means. Earlier work initially addressed regular networks (where each node has the 
same number of edges) and random networks (where a certain proportion of nodes is randomly 
connected by edges; Figure 2, left). In the last fifteen years, however, small-world and scale-free 
networks have gained prominence due to their interesting properties and widespread occurrence 
among real biological systems. A small-world network is defined in terms of the global property 
of the average path length between two nodes—averaged across all pairs of the network’s 
nodes—which grows logarithmically as the number of nodes increases. This means that for two 
randomly chosen nodes, the shortest distance between them (in terms of a path of intermediate 
nodes connected by edges) will be small relative to the size of the network. This global property 
usually entails that a signal propagates quickly from one part of the network to another. For a 
biological system this can have the advantage of enabling rapid reaction times. Many protein-
interaction networks are small-world for this reason (Albert 2005). 
A network’s degree distribution P(k) is the network-wide proportion of edges that is 
connected to k other nodes (i.e., the network’s proportion of nodes connected to only one other 
node, the proportion of nodes connected to two other nodes, and so on). The degree distribution 
is thus a global characteristic. A scale-free network is defined as a network that has a degree 
distribution that follows a power law of the form . This exponentially declining 
function means that across any scale-free network there are many nodes that are connected to 
only one or a few other nodes, while only few nodes are so-called hubs, which are connected to 
many other nodes (Figure 2, right). From this global property, predictions can be made about the 
network’s functionality. One is that it will exhibit robustness, which is the biologically important 
feature that a system will maintain its functionality despite perturbations. While the elimination 
of a node that is connected to one, or only a few other nodes, is unlikely to affect a network’s 
functionality, eliminating a node that is a hub may seriously impact how the network functions. 
But in a scale-free network there are comparatively few hubs, meaning that such a network is 
generally robust. A variety of actual biological networks of interest to systems biology are 
approximately scale-free, including metabolic networks and the gene regulatory networks of 
prokaryotes and eukaryotes (Albert 2005). 
 
 
γkckP )(
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Figure 2. An illustration of two kinds of large-scale networks. In the scale-free network, highly 
connected hub nodes are visualized in lighter grey. Reprinted from Barabási and Oltvai (2004) 
with permission from Nature Reviews Genetics, Macmillan Publishers Ltd, copyright 2004. 
Huneman (2010) coined the term ‘topological explanation’ for explanations of phenomena 
in terms of topological properties (including the structural properties of a graph). Although his 
focus is on ecological systems and evolutionary contexts, one important explanandum he 
addresses is equally relevant in systems biology: namely, robustness. Huneman argues that an 
explanation of a system’s general robustness to random node elimination in terms of its scale-
free network structure is a topological explanation. A topological explanation appeals to a 
system’s basic organization, in the same way the network motif explanations mentioned above 
do (Levy and Bechtel 2013), but it abstracts away from even the generic interactions or temporal 
features seen in motifs. This is at odds with mechanistic explanation, if the latter is to include 
significant physical detail (Craver 2007; Kaplan and Craver 2011), or if a mechanistic account’s 
explanatory status is taken to increase when more detail is added (Kaplan 2011; see Chapter 20). 
In any case, the fact that topological explanations neither list specific activities nor trace their 
operation from set-up to termination conditions is Huneman’s primary reason for contrasting this 
type of explanation against mechanistic explanation. 
Another case of topological explanation in the context of systems biology is the explanation 
of vulnerability (the opposite of robustness) in terms of bowtie structure (Jones 2014). A bowtie 
structure is a molecular network with the shape of a bowtie (Figure 3), in which it is obvious that 
the bowtie’s core is the weakest link because its deactivation (compared to any other node) will 
probably damage the whole network’s functionality. A concrete example is the explanation of 
why the human immune system is vulnerable to attacks on CD4+ T-cells (by HIV). The reason is 
that the molecular network of intercellular interactions and signalling pathways forms a bowtie 
that has the CD4+ T-cell type as its core (Figure 3; Kitano and Oda 2006). Generally then, it 
holds for scale-free networks that they are robust to random perturbations but vulnerable to 
attacks on the highly connected nodes (hubs or bowtie cores) that participate in a large number of 
interactions. Topological explanations such as these may well be instances of what some 
philosophers have discussed as distinctively mathematical explanations in natural science, which 
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have even been claimed to offer non-causal explanations of physical phenomena (Lange 2013). 
Our reason for invoking topological explanation, however, is simply to show how it contrasts 
with classic mechanistic accounts (see Bechtel 2015a; Woodward 2013). 
 
Figure 3: Bowtie network of CD4+ T-cells. Reproduced from Jones (2014) with permission from 
Erkenntnis, Springer, copyright 2014. 
Despite these insights, the value of graph-theoretical analysis for biological research is a 
contested issue, and critics have pointed to problems with the generalizations made about such 
networks (Arita 2004). For instance, whether gene regulatory networks are scale-free has been 
disputed, because some biological networks also exhibit properties similar to random networks 
(Barabási and Oltvai 2004; Keller 2005). Another common challenge is that networks usually 
provide a static picture of cellular systems, because the data that network edges are based on 
combine the totality of interactions that have been measured. However, all the edges represented 
need not be active at the same time or in the same location in vivo. A recent development, 
therefore, is to include temporal change when constructing topological mappings. When time-
course data is used, distinctions can be made between a ‘party hub’, which interacts with many 
entities at the same time, and a ‘date hub’, which interacts with only a few other entities despite 
having many overall connections and interaction partners (Han et al. 2004). In yeast metabolism 
research, protein interaction and gene expression data has been used to develop a time-dependent 
network that is sensitive to which proteins interact at a particular phase of the cell cycle (de 
Lichtenberg et al. 2005). This has provided new insight into the processes underlying the 
periodization of protein synthesis. 
As Section 1 discussed, research methods in systems biology have huge potential not only 
for extending mechanistic research but also for providing novel insights into how and why 
biological systems are organized into generalizable schemes with broad applications. As we have 
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demonstrated, graph-theoretical analysis affords a quantitative understanding of biological 
function and makes possible a comparison of organizational schemes in different functional 
systems. As well as cellular systems, neuronal, ecological, and even non-biological 
communication and transport networks are often scale-free or small-world networks, and can be 
analysed accordingly. Now we will show how network and systems analysis can be taken even 
further epistemically, in a way that provides additional philosophical insight into the relationship 
between systems biology and mechanistic research. 
3. Searching for and Using Design Principles 
An important research question in systems biology is the extent to which biological functions 
rely on general design principles that are largely independent of specific causal details and 
particular contexts of implementation (Poyatos 2012). Design principles are abstractions that 
describe characteristic organizational features of importance for a system’s functionality, such as 
negative feedback control, network motif configurations, or common architectures of biological 
and engineered networks. Aside from understanding how these design principles are causally 
instantiated in specific biological systems, an important explanatory question is why the same 
basic principles can describe the functioning of so many different systems. Some philosophers 
have recently argued that certain abstract models in systems biology, when answering that 
question, provide non-mechanistic design explanations that focus on generalizable constraints 
for biological functions (Braillard 2010; Green 2015b). In contrast, discussions of mechanisms 
have typically interpreted abstract models solely as heuristic tools or as mechanism schemas that 
guide the formulation of more realistic models (Matthiessen 2015; see Chapter 19). This 
resonates with the perspective of many experimental biologists, but has long been opposed by 
proponents of systems theory (Green and Wolkenhauer 2013). Rather than assuming that a 
model is useful only insofar it explains a biological system in concrete detail, current 
philosophical investigations of design explanations (and of topological explanations) are 
motivated by the goal of making sense of why some scientists rely on abstract models even in 
situations where more detailed models exist. 
One illuminating example is how biologists investigate systems exhibiting robust perfect 
adaptation (RPA) from an engineering perspective. RPA is the capacity of a system with sensors 
to return to the exact pre-stimulus activity after a stimulus-response reaction. This is important 
because it maintains the responsiveness of sensors. Creating designs with RPA is a goal in 
engineering human-made systems. Biological systems also exhibit RPA. Examples include the 
regulation of calcium homeostasis in mammals and membrane turgor pressure in yeast (Briat et 
al. 2015). In bacterial chemotaxis (movement in response to external chemical stimuli), RPA 
pertains to the regained responsiveness of transmembrane receptors (i.e., sensors) that detect 
changes in the concentration of chemicals in the environment. Adding a repellent to the bacterial 
environment leads to changes in the bacterial tumbling frequency (and thereby to random 
reorientations in space), but the receptor system returns very quickly to its equilibrium value. 
This enables the receptors to become sensitive to new changes, even if the repellent 
concentration continues increasing, which occurs when the bacterium swims along a chemical 
gradient. In the case of the bacterium E. coli, the mechanistic basis of its chemotactic RPA is 
known. It consists of transmembrane receptors, a signal transduction pathway inside the 
bacterium, and its connection to the flagellar motor. A feedback loop from the intracellular 
process back to the transmembrane receptor is important for achieving RPA (Barkai and Leibler 
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1997). 
The explanatory issue we are highlighting with bacterial chemotaxis is the question of what 
generic properties (abstract organizational features) make it possible for any system—not just E. 
coli—to exhibit RPA. The answer is integral feedback control (Yi et al. 2000). Used in 
engineering, integral feedback control is known in mathematical control theory as a special case 
of the internal model principle. When the environmental input u changes (see Figure 4), the 
difference between the actual output y1 and the desired output y0—the equilibrium value of the 
receptor—is fed back into the system as the integral of the system error. This feedback functions 
as a signal for the renormalization of the receptor, so that integral feedback control is sufficient 
for RPA. A crucial insight is provided by a theorem of Yi et al. (2000), which shows that (at least 
in linear systems) integral feedback control is necessary for achieving RPA. This explains why 
any system that exhibits RPA has to have an organization that instantiates integral feedback 
control (Iglesias 2013). E. coli should be no exception in this regard, and Yi et al. (2000) point 
out that an influential dynamic mechanistic model of RPA in bacteria (Barkai and Leibler 1997) 
does indeed embody the basic principle of integral feedback control. 
 
Figure 4. Diagram showing the abstract principle of Integral Feedback Control. Reproduced from 
Yi et al. (2000), with permission from PNAS, copyright (2000) National Academy of Sciences, 
USA. 
We can compare this account of chemotaxis with a standard mechanistic explanation. The 
latter would show how a particular structural organization causally generates and thus explains 
some function (e.g., RPA). In contrast, what Wouters (2007) calls a design explanation proceeds 
in the opposite direction, as the function to be performed (RPA in our case) explains the 
presence of some structural organization (integral feedback control). Using examples from 
physiology and functional anatomy, Wouters argues that such an explanation is non-causal, 
because it is based on law-like dependency relations between structures and functions. It maps 
out the possible structural realizers of a certain function, without going into a diachronic account 
of how the realizer or the need for the function came about causally. But regardless of where one 
stands on the status of non-causal explanations, in the case of bacterial chemotaxis, the design 
explanation does not just offer a list of the various concrete mechanisms that perform RPA (e.g., 
a transmembrane receptor, six Che proteins, and other details in E. coli). This is a non-
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mechanistic explanation in that it points to the abstract organizational feature of integral 
feedback control as a generic property that any system exhibiting RPA must instantiate (Braillard 
2010). This explanatory aim addresses a why-question that is distinct from the aim of explaining 
how a behaviour is mechanistically produced in some specific system.  
The example of design principles underpinning RPA in engineering and biology also 
provides more general philosophical lessons about the theoretical relevance of delineating the 
space of biological possibility. Mechanistic accounts have typically taken how-possibly models 
to have less explanatory power than how-actually models (Craver 2007; Kaplan 2011; Kaplan 
and Craver 2011; see Chapter 19). Yet, understanding the wider constraints on biological 
variation can in some contexts be of higher importance than describing how a specific function is 
causally produced in any specific system. Design principles can help researchers understand why 
the same structural patterns are found across different contexts: as a result of the constraints on 
possible architectures that can realize a given function. Importantly, this is not to be understood 
as a question that presupposes natural selection as the answer. Rather, the why-question 
addressed here is about the physically determined boundaries of the design space for a given 
function. 
Design principles do, however, have significance for evolutionary research as well as 
functional biology. Investigations of the constraints on evolutionary and developmental 
trajectories have often been associated with rather speculative ‘structuralist’ accounts, but some 
of these ideas have gained new relevance in the context of evolutionary systems biology (Green 
et al. 2015; Jaeger and Crombach 2012). Evolutionary systems biology is an umbrella term for 
very diverse approaches (O’Malley 2012), but one important aim is to investigate why certain 
general patterns arise in evolution. This is often done via models that represent the in silico 
evolution of gene regulatory networks. Structures like the network motifs discussed in Section 2 
are often assumed to be common because of regulatory functions favoured by natural selection 
(Alon 2007). Yet evolutionary simulation studies suggest that common structural patterns of 
networks, such as feedforward loops, may also result from constraints on genome evolution. 
These constraints are inherent in the mutational dynamics of gene duplication, deletion and 
recombination (Cordero and Hogeweg 2006). Research on evolutionary design principles, when 
understood as general patterns occurring from evolutionary trajectories, can thus generate insight 
into the potential and limits of biological variation. 
Design principles also identify the generic features that unite diverse systems exhibiting 
similar functional patterns (Green 2015b). By relating specific systems to general functional 
types, such as signal amplifiers, filters, or homeostatic regulators, these abstract principles 
facilitate the transfer of theoretical frameworks across disciplinary borders. Aside from this 
epistemic role, such structure-function mappings can serve practical aims. Similarly to Macleod 
and Nersessian’s (2015) emphasis on practical purposes such as control and prediction of 
modelling in systems biology, research on possibility spaces for biological structures can have 
practical goals such as templates for synthetic biology designs. Synthetic biology is the 
biological construction of material models, usually guided by mathematical modelling. ‘How-
possibly models’ can in this context be more important than ‘how-actually models’ because they 
elucidate the necessary structures for a certain function, like RPA, or reveal whether there are 
simpler possible designs than the ones found in nature (Briat et al. 2015; Ma et al. 2009). 
The upshot of this discussion is that abstract models are not always stepping stones toward 
more detailed mechanistic models. Aside from the practical purposes of control and 
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technological implementation, abstract design principles afford an understanding of why causally 
different systems in biology and engineering share certain organizational features, and how they 
are situated within larger spaces of physically possible designs. Consequently, an exclusive 
philosophical focus on mechanistic explanation (and even on dynamic mechanistic explanation) 
risks missing out on these diverse epistemic activities in systems biology. 
4. Discussion and Outlook 
Research in systems biology shows how strategies of abstraction are used in biology not only to 
simplify the task of identifying mechanisms but also to elucidate system-level patterns of 
organization that may not be visible at the level of the molecular details. Mechanistic accounts 
have usually been framed in opposition to explanatory unification, understood as the 
subsumption of the particular to general laws or explanatory schemas. But network modelling 
and the quest for design principles suggest an alternative way of thinking about the role of 
unification in biology: not via reduction of the particular to the general, but through abstraction 
from causal details for the purpose of identifying generic organizational patterns. 
Mathematical models (including network models and design principles) serve various roles 
in systems biology. Generally, mathematical frameworks provide a more rigorous way of 
exploring the extent to which biological functions are underpinned by characteristic 
organizational structures. Mathematical frameworks can also make engineering analogies more 
precise. Section 2 mentioned the identification of functional network motifs based on 
mathematically guided screening for overabundant circuit types. This search is inspired by an 
analogy to design principles in electronic networks, and the structural decomposition of the 
network preceded the functional analysis of the modules of the network (see Chapter 35). In 
other cases, the biological function is known and systems biologists set out to explore the extent 
to which the function is similarly realized in engineered systems (e.g., robustness). Mathematical 
abstractions and design principles can articulate constraints that delimit the search space for an 
analysis. Delineating search space may serve the development of mechanistic explanations. At 
the same time, network models and design principles provide an understanding complementary 
to mechanistic explanation. Although an important virtue of mechanistic explanations is to make 
sense of biological diversity through attention to specific causal difference-makers and material 
composition, abstraction strategies can help scientists see similarities in the way functional 
systems—from airplanes to organisms—are organized. 
Generally, a focus by philosophers on the issue of mechanistic explanation has left many 
aspects of systems biology unexplored. We have pointed to the use of models for the purpose of 
prediction, control, or the creation of simple and efficient designs that can be implemented in 
synthetic organisms. Another topic of major interest to systems biologists that is philosophically 
rich is robustness. In many cases when a system maintains its functioning despite noise and even 
major perturbations, this is due to dynamic reorganization, where the organismal system 
responds flexibly by changing interaction patterns and levels, including establishing new 
interactions (Wagner 2005). This puts pressure on the assumption that systems biology always 
investigates mechanisms (on a machine-like conception), or that all explanations about systems 
exhibiting dynamic reorganization or robustness are mechanistic (in the sense of referencing the 
mechanism’s specific organization; Brigandt 2015; Gross 2015; Woodward 2013). 
Some of the questions that deserve more attention by philosophers pertain to issues that are 
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currently controversial within the systems biology community itself. One is the question of 
whether complex living systems can be understood in terms of engineering notions (Braillard 
2015; Green 2015a), and particularly whether the heuristic assumption of modularity is 
warranted. Research on network motifs is often predicated on the idea that an individual motif is 
modular, meaning that its functionality is unaffected by the system context in which it occurs 
(Section 2). The traditional mechanistic strategies of decomposition into distinct components and 
the localization of some function to a certain component also resonate with the assumption that 
biological systems are modular. However, many systems biologists observe highly integrated 
functionality across large-scale networks, which suggests that systems need to be investigated 
not in terms of modularity but via more connectivist perspectives that can capture features 
emerging from system-wide dynamics (Huang 2004; see also Bassingthwaighte et al. 2009; 
Bechtel 2015a). 
Our discussion draws attention to a wide range of explanatory and modelling strategies in 
systems biology. We have shown how some explanatory aims and outputs are not mechanistic 
according standard philosophical interpretations of mechanistic explanations, and indeed, that 
some of the practices in systems biology lie outside existing philosophical frameworks. But well 
beyond these negative insights, we have depicted the wealth of modelling approaches at work in 
systems biology, and how further philosophical scrutiny of them will enhance the investigation 
of biological systems and philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation and explanation in 
general. 
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